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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a scheme for detecting manipulated audio and video. The scheme is a synthesis of
blockchains, encrypted spread spectrum watermarks, perceptual hashing and digital signatures, which we call an Em-
bedded Blockchain. Within this scheme, we use the blockchain for its data structure of a cryptographically linked
list, cryptographic hashing for absolute comparisons, perceptual hashing for flexible comparisons, digital signatures
for proof of ownership, and encrypted spread spectrum watermarking to embed the blockchain into the background
noise of the media. So each media recording has its own unique blockchain, with each block holding information de-
scribing the media segment. The problem of verifying the integrity of the media is recast to traversing the blockchain,
block–by–block, and segment–by–segment of the media. If any chain is broken, the difference in the computed and
extracted perceptual hash is used to estimate the level of manipulation.
Index Terms – blockchains, digital watermarking, perceptual hashing, digital signatures, tamper detection, deep-
fakes.
1 Introduction
The creation of artificially–generated video and audio has
become more prevalent in recent years with advances in
deep learning technologies including generative adversar-
ial networks (GANs) and are now at a point where they
are staggeringly realistic [30][20]. These are commonly
known as deepfakes.
The majority of the methods proposed to detect deep-
fakes involve using deep learning [15]. These deep learn-
ing methods are improving rapidly; in the future it may
be impossible to distinguish deepfakes from real media.
There is an ever increasing commercial desire to track
the provenance and integrity of audio, photos and video.
Ongoing notable projects aiming to address deepfakes
or manipulated video and audio include The Deepfake
Detection Challenge by Facebook and Microsoft, The
News Provenance Project by The New York Times and the
DARPA MediFor (Media Forensics) program [9][17][21].
Contemporary solutions for detecting deepfakes or
manipulated media generally operate after the suspected
manipulations have taken place. We propose a two–step
process; firstly, the media is marked in real time as its
captured with a series of unique identifiers. Subsequently
if the provenance of the media is questioned, the second
step of verification of the media occurs.
In order to verify the integrity of the media using only
the media and its embedded data, the unique identifiers
should possess the following properties:
1. Hidden from human perception.
2. Provide proof of ownership.
3. Describe the content.
4. Impose a temporal ordering on the content.
These identifiers could be hidden (or partially hidden)
from human perception using a spread spectrum water-
mark [7][8][22][26].
Proof of ownership can be verified by extraction of
the encrypted watermark data, or by verification of a dig-
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2ital signature once the watermark data is extracted and
decrypted.
Cryptographic hashing can provide a bit–level de-
scription of the content, and perceptual hashing could
provide a flexible description of the content.
Blockchains are used to link segments of the media
together and impose a temporal ordering via hashing. The
blockchain also prevents the removal, insertion or rear-
ranging of any segments (blocks) of the media.
We call the synthesis of blockchains, encrypted spread
spectrum watermarking and perceptual hashing an Em-
bedded Blockchain.
Our solution does not require a trusted authority to
verify the media stream against an original, as all the nec-
essary data describing the media is contained within the
Embedded Blockchain which is hidden in the media.
An obvious application for such a scheme is smart-
phones – where hidden datasets could be embedded in the
video and audio; which would provide a unique link to the
phone and mark the dataset with information describing
its contents.
2 Blockchains
Blockchains were invented in 2008 by a person or group
of people, under the name Satoshi Nakamoto [18]. The
blockchain serves as a public transaction ledger of the
cryptocurrency, Bitcoin. Nakamoto outlined a data struc-
ture for chaining blocks of data together by their crypto-
graphic hash. Previously, Haber and Stornetta developed
a robust method for time-stamping digital documents by
hashing the document with that of the previous document,
thus making a cryptographically linked list [13].
The central idea is any changes to the data of any
one block will, with overwhelming probability, change
the hash of the block and all subsequent blocks; thus im-
posing an immutable temporal ordering of the data in the
blocks.
Figure 1: A conceptual diagram of the blockchain.
Our use of the blockchain is primarily for its data
structure. For our purposes we can think of the blockchain
as a cryptographically linked list.
3 Spread Spectrum Watermarking
Spread spectrum (Digital) watermarking (or water-
marking) is a steganographic technique which embeds
an imperceptible message in a noise-tolerant signal
[7][8][22][26]. Spread spectrum watermarking was in-
vented by Andrew Tirkel and Charles Osborne in 1992
[26]. Commonly watermarked noise–tolerant signals in-
clude audio, imagery and video. More abstract datasets
are also amenable to watermarking [23].
The hidden message is embedded into the signal using
families of sequences, or multi-dimensional arrays which
possess good periodic autocorrelation and pairwise cross–
correlation [1][3][27]. The message is encoded as cyclic
shifts of the sequences or multi–dimensional arrays.
A secure watermark can be created by encrypting the
families watermarking arrays prior to embedding in the
signal. In recent years a number of image–based encryp-
tion methods have been proposed [5][24][29][31].
The process of embedding a watermark in a media
stream is summarised in the following diagram.
Figure 2: A conceptual diagram of the watermark embed-
ding process.
In the diagram above, the watermarking parameters
may include the embedding strength, the embedding do-
3main, the family of arrays, the array size and dimension-
ality of the arrays.
The number of arrays required to embed the hidden
message depends on the message length, the array size
and array dimensionality (as increasing the dimensional-
ity increases the watermark payload capacity [3]). Esti-
mating the optimal embedding strength requires balancing
perceptibility of the watermark with robust extraction of
the hidden message. Furthermore, the robust extraction
of the watermark is dependent on the number of arrays
embedded and consequently depends on the size of the
hidden message.
The extraction of a watermark is summarised in the
following diagram.
Figure 3: A conceptual diagram of the watermark extrac-
tion process.
To determine if the watermark extraction was success-
ful, the signal–to–noise ratio (SNR) of each array is com-
pared to a predetermined noise level.
4 Cryptographic & Perceptual
Hashing
Cryptographic hash functions compress an arbitrary num-
ber of bits into a fixed number of bits. The cryptographic
hash is a one–way function, which are computationally
prohibitive to invert. They act as a unique identifier of the
input data, such that two similar inputs will almost cer-
tainly result in vastly different outputs (by the avalanche
effect [10]). If two distinct inputs return the same cryp-
tographic hash, known as a collision, then the hashing
function is considered broken. Many hashing functions
have been broken, such as the widely used MD5 hash
[4]. Robust cryptographic hashing functions include the
SHA2 family, which was developed by the NSA.
Perceptual hashing functions are very different to
cryptographic hashes. Unlike cryptographic hashes, per-
ceptual hashes are similar if their inputs have similar fea-
tures. The difference between two perceptual hashes is
used as a metric of dissimilarity. Perceptual hashes are
applicable to both audio and imagery [11][19][28].
5 Digital Signatures
Digital signatures are a form of asymmetric encryption
which is used to bind a person or entity to digital data.
We sign some data with a private key. Once signed, the
data and the signature can be disseminated. Verification
happens with a public key, the data and the signature. If
the data or signature has changed the public key will in-
validate the signature.
Incorporating a digital signature into the Embedded
Blockchain gives us the ability to distribute the watermark
encryption password, so the media can be independently
verified and still keep control of the creation of our unique
Embedded Blockchain via the private key of the digital
signature.
6 Embedded Blockchains
We now have all the necessary ingredients to describe
the Embedded Blockchain. Our description is in terms of
video, however it can be applied to audio or any abstract
dataset which has a temporal or lexical ordering and is
amenable to spread spectrum watermarking.
As discussed earlier, we embed a series of groups of
unique identifiers into the video with the following fea-
tures:
1. Hidden from human perception.
2. Provide proof of ownership.
3. Describe the content.
4. Impose a temporal ordering on the content.
Each group of unique identifiers describes one seg-
ment of the media. We refer to the data in this group
as a block. The blocks are chained together using cryp-
tographic and perceptual hashes. Additionally, a small
amount of user–defined data may be included in each
block, for example, a time stamp or some covert informa-
tion.
Before we can describe the embedding and extraction
processes we need to decide on the segment size that we
4wish to describe in each block. For simplicity we can
think of the segment size as a single frame of video. This
size can vary to accommodate real time embedding or to
balance embedding time with the fidelity of the perceptual
hash for application–specific requirements.
6.1 Describe & Embed
Consider the first segment, which is different to all sub-
sequent segments, as it does not contain a block. We
compute the perceptual and cryptographic hashes of this
segment and digitally sign the perceptual hash of the seg-
ment. Then we form the block by accumulating this data
with the user-defined data and embed it into the second
segment using the spread spectrum watermark.
Segments are chained together by embedding the data
describing segment n into segment n + 1. This is sum-
marised in the diagram below.
Figure 4: A conceptual diagram of the creation of the Em-
bedded Blockchain.
If we are using lossy compression to store the video,
then we replace the cryptographic hash of the n–th seg-
ment with the cryptographic hash of the perceptual hash
of the n–th segment. This way, modifying a single seg-
ment will still break all subsequent chains.
6.2 Extract & Verify
Given a video which contains an Embedded Blockchain
we wish to verify that the video has not been manipu-
lated. As this video contains an Embedded Blockchain,
we can recast the problem of detecting any manipulations
to traversing the Embedded Blockchain, block–by-block
and segment–by–segment, where for each segment we
compute the cryptographic hashes, perceptual hashes and
digital signatures, then compare these computed values
to the corresponding data extracted from the embedded
block. If the cryptographic hash does not match, then
some modification has occurred and we can measure the
level of modification with the difference between the com-
puted and extracted perceptual hashes.
If the block is not recoverable from the watermark,
then it is immediately evident that the chain of blocks is
broken and the segment has been modified.
It is important to note that we have not relied on any
external data to make this determination. For example,
we have not compared the video to a untampered original,
nor looked up the hash of the video in a database, nor re-
lied upon a deep learning approach which needs millions
of test cases for training.
The extraction and verification scheme is summarised
in the following diagram.
5Figure 5: A conceptual diagram of verifying one block.
When extracting the block from the watermark, the
same watermarking parameters used in the embedding
process must be used.
There is no requirement that the user data is static
from block to block, and may be accumulated block–by–
block and bit–by–bit to store larger amounts of data.
6.3 Practical Considerations
We will now detail some practical considerations for the
design and implementation of an Embedded Blockchain.
These include
1. The hash size. The main consideration with the
hash size is the need to balance the security of
the cryptographic hash and digital signature, the fi-
delity of the perceptual hash, and the size of the
user data embedded in each block with the size of
the hidden message embedded in the watermark.
2. The segment size. Increasing the segment size de-
creases the temporal resolution of each block, how-
ever it increases the space to store the block. In-
creasing the segment size is useful when embedding
in a format which aggressively compresses the me-
dia. Increasing the segment size also decreases the
computational work required to create the Embed-
ded Blockchain.
3. Comparing perceptual hashes. Absolute numeri-
cal equality would be desirable, however when us-
ing lossy compression to store the media often a
threshold needs to be estimated (as a function of
the media size, the segment size and the bitrate of
the perceptual hash).
4. The size and dimensionality of the watermark-
ing arrays. Increasing the size of the arrays also
increases the SNR of the block extraction. Increas-
ing the dimensionality also increases the size of the
hidden message. On the other hand increasing the
dimensionality also decreases the bit-rate of each
shift.
5. The embedding domain of the watermark. Com-
mon choices are the spatial and Fourier do-
mains, however there are many possible choices
[6][12][25]. The choice of embedding domain will
effect the perceptibility and SNR of the watermark
extraction.
6. The user data. Increasing the size of user data in-
creases the size of the block and subsequently the
number of watermarking arrays required to embed,
which decreases the SNR of the watermark extrac-
tion.
6.4 Exemplar Calculation of the Block Size
for Compressed Video
A key software engineering challenge of the Embedded
Blockchain is the data carrying capacity of the water-
mark in the presence of lossy video compression schemes,
whilst remaining visually imperceptible.
We will now detail a calculation which estimates the
data capacity of the watermark for a single segment of
4K resolution video (3840 by 2160 px). We have embed-
ded a family of 2D arrays of size 1087 × 1087 in a 2 × 4
6tiled arrangement. These arrays possess good autocorre-
lation and pairwise cross–correlation properties [3]. The
watermark embedding was in the spatial domain and the
segment size (the number of frames described in a single
block) was 15, or approximately half–second blocks.
Each 2D watermarking array can hold 2 integers in
base 1087. If we allocate 3, 256–bit hashes for the digital
signature, perceptual hash, cryptographic hash and 256–
bits for user data in each block, then we must store 1024
bits in the watermark (per block). We can bit–pack the
1024 bits into 104 base 1087 integers, or 52, 2D arrays.
In the following graphic we have plotted the mean
SNR of the watermark extraction with the size of the hid-
den message.
Figure 6: A comparison of the watermark extraction SNR
with the length of the hidden message. The compres-
sion schemes used were MJPEG, MPEG–1, MPEG–2 and
H.264. The estimated SNR of random noise and the 3–
and 6–sigma confidence intervals are shown.
This calculation indicates a 1024 bit block size is fea-
sible, as the SNR for a message length of 104 is above
the 6–sigma confidence interval from the mean noise
level. For MJPEG, MPEG–1 and MPEG–2 we achieved
this message length with an embedding strength of 0.5%,
whereas for H.264 we needed an embedding strength of
1.5%. The required increase in embedding strength is due
to the aggressive compression used in the H.264 scheme.
7 Conclusions
We have described a two–step scheme to detect manipu-
lations in media including video and audio. If efficiently
implemented, this scheme should be able to run passively
on a battery–powered device like a smartphone when cap-
turing a video or audio recording. If so, it is likely that in
the future all recording devices will contain an Embedded
Blockchain–like scheme for proof of ownership and con-
tent verification.
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